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  General practitioners (GPs) play an important role in cancer screening activities.  
 A DCE was used to assess the importance of financial and non-financial incentives. 
 Both types of incentives are required to boost GPs’ cancer screening provision.  
 The relative impact of incentives differs across screening contexts. 
 Additional payment seems relatively more incentivizing for colorectal cancer.  
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General practitioners (GPs) play a key role in the delivery of preventive and screening services 
for breast, cervical, and colorectal cancers. In practice, GPs’ involvement varies considerably 
across types of cancer and among GPs, raising important questions about the determinants of 
GPs’ implication in screening activities: what is the relative impact of financial and non-financial 
incentives? Are GPs’ preferences for financial and non-financial incentives cancer-specific? Is 
there preference heterogeneity and how much does it differ according to the screening context? 
This study investigates the determinants of GPs’ involvement in cancer screening activities using 
the discrete choice experiment (DCE) methodology. A representative sample of 402 GPs was 
recruited in France between March and April, 2014. Marginal rates of substitution were used to 
compare GPs’ preferences for being involved in screening activities across three types of cancers: 
breast, cervical, and colorectal. Variability of preferences was investigated using Hierarchical 
Bayes mixed logit models. The results indicate that GPs are sensitive to both financial and non-
financial incentives, such as a compensated training and systematic transmission of information 
about screened patients, aimed to facilitate communication between doctors and patients. There 
is also evidence that the level and variability of preferences differ across screening contexts, 
although the variations are not statistically significant on average. GPs appear to be relatively 
more sensitive to financial incentives for being involved in colorectal cancer screening, whereas 
they have higher and more heterogeneous preferences for non-financial incentives in breast and 
cervical cancers. Our study provides new findings for policymakers interested in prioritizing 
levers to increase the supply of cancer screening services in general practice. 
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Cancer is a major health issue worldwide (WHO, 2008). Preventive care, such as screening, is 
important for reducing the mortality and burden of cancer (Gellad and Provenzale, 2010; 
Kerlikowske et al., 1995; Quinn et al., 1999). In many healthcare systems, general practitioners 
(GPs) play an important role in delivering preventive care and appropriate recommendation for 
the screening of breast, cervical, and colorectal cancer (Carrieri and Bilger, 2013; Jensen et al., 
2012; Weller, 1997). In a study analysing decision-making processes for several cancers among a 
national sample of US adults, providers such as GPs were cited as the most highly rated 
information source for initiating screening discussion and recommending screening (Hoffman et 
al., 2010). However, GPs’ involvement in cancer screening varies considerably across types of 
cancer and among GPs (Federici et al., 2005; Ganry and Boche, 2005). In a representative survey 
conducted by the French National Institute of Cancer (INCa), GPs reported that they “routinely” 
check breast, cervical, and colorectal cancer screening in 56%, 45% and 34% of consultations 
(Bungener et al., 2010). This somewhat low level of screening performance and the between-
cancer variability raise important questions about the determinants of GPs’ participation in 
cancer screening activities. For instance, what makes GPs willing to be involved in cancer 
screening activities? Do GPs differ in their attitudes towards different types of cancer?  
Previously, it has been suggested that financial incentives such as pay-for-performance 
(P4P) would greatly influence GPs’ decisions to deliver preventive services for cancer (Armour et 
al., 2004; Town et al., 2005). For instance, in France, GPs earn financial bonuses in addition to 
their fee-for-service (FFS) remuneration if they reach (or draw closer to) a target rate of 80% of 
women aged between 50 and 74 years having been screened for breast cancer in the past two 
years. In France, GPs are mostly paid on a FFS base whereas in the Scandinavian countries and 
in the UK, doctors are primarily paid through a per capita mechanism. The latter has been shown 
to be more favorable to the supply of prevention while FFS provides no incentive to supply 
preventive care if not compensated (Franc and Lesur, 2004; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011). 
Economic theory predicts that monetary incentives may induce optimal provision of healthcare 
services but the empirical analyses show mixed results (Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Mannion and 
Davies, 2008) and nonsignificant results for preventive care (Kiran et al., 2014; Li et al., 2014; 
Sicsic and Franc, 2016). Initially, the low performance of P4P has been explained by inadequate 
level of financial incentives (Town et al., 2005) and their temporal nature, as prevention may have 
long or mid-term returns of investment. Indeed, P4P remuneration is based on an annual 
measure of GPs’ activity in terms of cancer screening provision, whereas the benefits of 
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screening are expected in much longer term. Other studies have suggested potential unintended 
consequences of financial incentives, particularly the crowding out of doctors’ intrinsic (non-
financial) motivations by extrinsic (financial) rewards (Janus, 2010; Sicsic et al., 2012), which may 
contribute to explain the low impact of P4P on GPs’ prevention activities. 
Other non-financial factors are likely to play a significant role in GPs’ decisions regarding 
cancer screening. These non-financial factors include physicians training, receiving feedback, and 
assistance from other non-health professionals (McIlfatrick et al., 2013; Sabatino et al., 2008). 
Previous studies investigated doctors’ preferences for key job attributes concerning location 
choices in general practice by focusing on the role of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
incentives (Günther et al., 2010; Holte et al., 2015; Scott, 2001). Holte et al (2015) found that 
additional income had smaller impact on GPs’ choices than improvements in non-monetary 
attributes such as opportunity for professional development. To the best of our knowledge, there 
is no similar evidence for the role of pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives in GPs’ preferences 
for cancer-screening activities. 
This study offers to bridge this gap by investigating how GPs trade financial and non-
financial incentives when making decisions to be involved in screening activities for three types 
of cancers, namely breast, cervical, and colorectal cancer. For these cancers, the effectiveness of 
screening is recognized and guidelines are available (Saslow et al., 2012), despite recent debates 
about the benefits and harms balance for breast cancer screening (Gøtzsche and Nielsen, 2011). 
A better understanding of how financial and non-financial incentives influence GPs’ decisions 
and interact with each other will help to improve effectiveness, quality, and sustainability of 
screening programmes. Given the considerable variability in GP’s involvement in cancer 
screening activities, it is important to understand how GPs’ preferences differ across both 
cancers and GPs themselves. We address this issue by investigating heterogeneity in GPs’ 
preferences for cancer screening programmes by fitting Hierarchical Bayes mixed logit models 
and by comparing preferences across breast, cervical, and colorectal cancers.  
In the next section, we summarize the literature on interventions to improve delivery of 
preventive services and review the French context for cancer screening. In section 3, we present 
the discrete choice experiment (DCE) survey and the statistical methodology used to respond to 




2. Literature  
2.1/Interventions to increase delivery of preventive services 
Much of the research to date has focused on evaluating the efficacy of interventions aimed at 
promoting behaviour change among healthcare providers (Ellis et al., 2005; Grimshaw et al., 
2001; Sabatino et al., 2012, 2008; Zapka and Lemon, 2004). In their literature review, Grimshaw 
et al (2001) found that active interventions, such as reminders and educational outreach, were 
effective in changing healthcare provider behaviour, whereas less active interventions (e.g. 
attending conferences, reading medical journals) were not effective. Another study found that no 
single intervention was effective across the cancer continuum (Ellis et al., 2005). Interventions 
that were effective in several topic areas included the use of office systems (reminders and 
prompts), health care provider advice, removal of financial barriers, and multi-component 
interventions. In their literature review, Sabatino et al (2008) identified ten studies that reported 
the use of provider assessment and feedback to increase recommendation for breast, cervical, and 
colorectal cancer screening. They concluded that assessment and feedback interventions 
produced positive effects in both trainee and non-trainee physician groups but financial 
incentives alone were not effective. The result was confirmed four years later in an updated 
literature review (Sabatino et al., 2012). 
The conclusions obtained in these various studies, although different, are not necessarily 
contradictory. It is possible that some screening incentives would act as complements and then 
their valuation would differ depending on whether they are combined or not. Besides, the 
context in which the various screenings are enrolled may influence how the incentive is perceived 
by GPs. It is thus essential to analyze more precisely the French screening context and the role 
played by the GP in each context. 
2.2/The French screening context for cancer 
In France, a national program for breast cancer screening has been implemented since 2004: 
women aged 50-74 years are mailed an invitation to perform a free mammogram (free at the 
point of use) in a radiological centre. They can choose a doctor (e.g. a GP or a gynaecologist) 
who will be informed of the results of the mammogram. Thus, referral GPs might not always be 
informed of the realization of a mammogram by their eligible patients, and this lack of 
information could constitute a barrier and hinder their involvement in breast cancer screening 
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(Liberalotto, 2012). Accordingly, systematic communication of the screening results to the 
referral GP could be one interesting method to promote.  
To increase the take-up of colorectal cancer screening, a national program was 
implemented in 2009: men and women between 50 and 74 years are invited by mail to perform a 
free faecal occult blood test (FOBT) in a biological centre, and the referral GP should always be 
informed of the results. The GP takes a leading role in facilitating patient adherence to the 
national programmes: he/she is supposed to propose the test and explain the modalities of 
implementation and the consequences in case of positivity. Yet, GPs report being the initiators of 
a discussion about colorectal cancer screening in less than half of the cases (Bungener et al., 
2010). One possible explanation could be related to the time required for its proposal in 
consultation and explanation of how it works. We assume that GPs could be sensitive to qualified 
staff assistance and/or additional compensation to offset the effort.  
Cervical cancer screening (based on smear tests) has not yet been included in a national 
program (only experimentations are ongoing). Sociological studies have investigated GPs’ 
opinions and attitudes concerning the effectiveness of experimental programs conducted locally 
(Liberalotto, 2012). Two main mechanisms implemented by local associations promoting cervical 
cancers screening were often cited by the GPs: practical training for the implementation of smear 
tests intended to the GP and the provision of information leaflets to the patient. Even if cervical 
cancer screening is mostly performed during gynaecologist consultations, GPs’ role is recognized 
by the profession: 45% of GPs declare to routinely check cervical cancer screening, half of which 
declare that “performing this act is part of [their] job” (Bungener et al., 2010). In this context, a 
P4P programme was extended to cervical cancer screening in 2012 through the Rémunénation sur 
Objectif de Santé Publique (ROSP). 
3. Discrete choice experiment 
A stated preferences discrete choice experiment (DCE) was conducted to measure GPs’ 
preferences for cancer screening incentives in three different contexts, namely breast, cervical, 
and colorectal cancer. DCEs are widely used in health to investigate patients, public, and health 
professionals’ preferences for treatments or medical procedures (Clark et al., 2014; de Bekker-
Grob et al., 2012). Discrete choice experiments are underpinned by Lancaster’s consumer theory 
(Lancaster, 1966) which assumes that the utility of a product or service is derived from its 
characteristics (attributes). DCEs ask participants to make choices between several hypothetical 
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scenarios offering different combinations of attributes, in order to infer their preferences for each 
attribute or combination of attributes, independently. The first step consist in selecting attributes 
and levels, the second step is choosing an appropriate design for the choice tasks, the third step is 
sampling respondents and collecting data, and the last step is analysing data using econometric 
models.  
3.1/ Selection of attributes and levels 
The selection of attributes and levels was based on a literature review (see section 2) and 
interviews with ten GPs as well as members of two local structures managing the screening 
programmes at the departmental level. A thematic analysis of interviews was conducted to 
determine the most important aspects of screening programmes delivery (e.g. communication of 
information, skills, rewards) to include in the DCE study. For each cancer screening context, five 
attributes were selected: the first four attributes were non-financial (or transfers in kind) with two 
levels and the last attribute was a financial incentive with four levels of payment (see Table 1 for a 
summary of attributes, and Supplementary file A for a detailed description of attributes).  
 The Leaflet (LEAF) attribute consisted of cancer screening leaflets intended for the 
patient designed to facilitate doctor-patient communication and transmission of information, in 
order to possibly improve the screening acceptability and patient adherence. The Leaflet 
incentive is in line with the results of McIlfatrick et al (2013), i.e. the notion of empowering 
individuals to take responsibility for their health issues. 
 The Training (TRAIN) attribute was a compensated training for the GP, aimed to 
improve his/her feelings of autonomy and competence encountered in the doctor-patient 
relationship and ultimately increase his/her motivation and involvement in cancer screening. This 
training included the analysis of the difficulties in the implementation of screening, strategies of 
conviction and practical application, and coordination with other specialists. The training slightly 
differed according to the screening context, focusing on the benefits/risks of mammography in 
breast cancer screening, and on the realisation of pap smears in cervical cancer screening.  
 The Listing (LIST) attribute was a bi-annual listing of screened patients destined to the 
GPs, updated every 6 months, designed to promote GPs’ access to information and save time 
during regular consultations schedules in the process of updating patient’s records. According to 
the results of the literature, we assumed that this incentive might be more valued by GPs in the 
context of breast and cervical cancers screening, because GPs are not always informed of the 
results of the test (Liberalotto, 2012). 
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 The Assistance (ASSIST) attribute was a qualified staff assistance designed to help GPs 
with cancer screening follow-up. It was thought as a ‘material’ support to doctors who, for 
instance, could run out of time in their daily practice and/or require additional assistance or 
technical staff.  
 The Payment (PAY) attribute was a financial device in line with P4P systems. It offered 
different levels of additional remuneration as a percentage increase of the year fees (0%, 1%, 3%, 
5%) based on reaching a specific target of screened patients, patients for which the doctor was 
the referral GP. We chose the same targets as proposed by the National Health Authority (HAS, 
France’s equivalent to NICE in the UK), i.e. 80% for breast and cervical cancer screening, and 
50% for colorectal cancer screening. 
Assuming the majority of GPs would prefer receiving support for promoting cancer 
screening, we expected all 5 attributes to have significant and positive effects on GPs’ decisions. 
For example, offering training (TRAIN) would increase the probability of GPs being involved in 
cancer screening programmes. 
3.2/ Design of the choice tasks 
We used NGENE software (ChoiceMetrics) to generate a 12 choice tasks D-efficient design 
(94% D-efficiency) with non-informative (null) priors and allowing estimation of all main effects 
as well as two pre-specified interactions effects (LEAF x PAY; ASSIST x LIST) that were judged 
particularly relevant following previous interviews with GPs. We wanted to investigate a potential 
interaction effect between the Leaflet and the Payment, because providing and explaining leaflets 
to patients is time consuming and then GPs would need to be compensated for the income loss 
due to immediate decrease in their productivity. Despite this initial opportunity cost, GPs may be 
willing to provide leaflets for free (i.e., without needing a final compensation) because it can be 
seen as an investment that would help GPs save time during future consultations by empowering 
(or enabling) patients.  
The second interaction effect between the Assistance and the Listing was motivated by 
the assumption that Listing might be more valued when accompanied with trained staff to help 
identify and raise the awareness of individuals not up to date with their screening. Conversely, 




A binary response format was used to create the choice tasks, in which participants faced 
one hypothetical screening programme at a time and were asked to indicate whether they would 
change their usual screening practice for the proposed scenario (‘yes/no’). This choice format 
closely mimics decisions problems faced by GPs in their daily practice. We also offered to the 
participants the possibility to not choose between their current situation and the hypothetical one 
by answering “I don’t know”. This option was used to avoid forced choices that could be 
unreliable, and it can be seen as a structured way of providing missing values. An example of a 
choice task is presented in Figure 1. The same design was used for all three screening contexts 
(i.e., breast, cervical, and colorectal cancer). 
3.3/ Sampling and recruitment 
The DCE was included in an online survey sent to a listing of representative French GPs using 
the quota sampling method. Respondents accessed the questionnaire by clicking on a link that 
was included in an e-mail containing little information about the survey, in order to limit the 
selection of respondents. GPs were recruited by a survey company. All precautions were taken to 
ensure anonymity of the data, in agreement with the CNIL (Commission Nationale de 
l’Informatique et des Libertés, French law no. 78-17). The questionnaire took about 15 minutes 
to be completed, and respondents were remunerated €28 for their participation to offset the 
opportunity cost of its completion. Before responding to the DCE, each GP was randomly 
assigned to one screening context (i.e., breast, cervical, or colorectal cancer). For each type of 
cancer screening, a quota was applied based on age, gender, and practice location distribution: if 
the GP entered the quota, he/she could respond to the remaining of the questionnaire.  
The sampling objective was to obtain a total of 400 completed questionnaires. The 
number of participants was computed using the Louviere et al (2000) approximate formulae for 
DCE sample size. For a choice probability of 50%, accuracy level of 10%, confidence level of 5% 
and 12 experimental tasks, the minimum number of respondents is 33 per type of cancer 
screening. Then we multiplied this minimum requirement by 4 to obtain a sample robust to 
individuals’ idiosyncrasies and allowing for investigation of variability in preferences. The survey 
was addressed to approximately 4,000 GPs between March and April, 2014, until the expected 
number of completed questionnaires was reached. Among the 4,000 internet links sent, 685 were 
consulted and 402 resulted in a completed questionnaire (59% incidence rate). Before launching 
the survey, a pre-test survey was conducted among ten GPs to check the respondents’ 
understanding of the attributes and their levels, as well as the questionnaire in general. As a result 
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of their feedback, we added the possibility to check the exhaustive definition of attributes at any 
time during completion of the choice experiment, and added a coloured bar so that respondents 
could check their progression in the questionnaire. 
3.4/Discrete choices modelling 
Question 1: What are GPs’ preferences for both financial and non-financial incentives? 
The GPs’ preferences were measured within the random utility maximization framework 
(Manski, 1977; Thurstone, 1927) using a binary logit model, which is a specific case of the 
traditional multinomial logit model that not hold the restrictive independence of irrelevant 
alternatives assumption (McFadden, 1974). In each choice task t (t=1,…,T), the response to 
cancer screening programme i (i={yes,no}) by GP n (n=1,…,N) was related to a utility function 
composed of a deterministic part (      and a stochastic part (     . Different functional forms 
were tested for the deterministic part of the utility function: first a linear additive utility function 
with no interactions between attributes (equation 1); second a multiplicative utility function with 
the two above-mentioned interactions between attributes (equation 2).  
1 2 3 4 5  +     (1)
     
nti t t t t t ntiU LEAF TRAIN LIST ASSIST PAY           
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 +    (2)
     
nti t t t t t t t t t ntiU LEAF TRAIN LIST ASSIST PAY PAY LEAF ASSIST LIST                 
In equation 1 and 2, LEAFt, TRAINt, ..., PAYt, represent the levels of the attributes presented in 
choice task t,   is a constant term,            are the part-worth utility coefficients for the five 
attributes, and       are the coefficients of the interaction effects. We assumed a positive impact 
of the financial and non-financial attributes on GPs’ utility function, as well as positive 
interaction effects. The PAY attribute was coded linearly and the non-financial attributes were 
dummy coded. The standard errors of the estimates were corrected for group clustering.  
Question 2: Are GPs’ preferences cancer-specific?  
We compared the preferences between the three types of cancer using marginal rates of 
substitution (MRS) between the non-financial attributes and the payment. The MRS were derived 
from the results of the binary logit models with no interaction (equation 1). Computation of MRS 
values allowed normalisation of coefficients by eliminating the scale coefficient (i.e. the variance 
of the error term     ) thus allowing direct comparison of mean preferences between cancer 
screening contexts. The 95% confidence intervals around the MRS were calculated using the 
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Delta method (Hole, 2007). The MRS between the PAY attribute and each non-financial attribute 
indicate the percentage of potential additional payment (percentage of their annual turnover) the 
GPs were willing to give up in exchange of the non-financial attribute k. This interpretation is 
very similar to a conclusion in terms of willingness-to-pay (WTP), except that WTP are generally 
computed with a fixed price coefficient that is expected to have a negative value and to be 
independent of individual actions, whereas the payment is expected to be positive and 
conditional on the GP’s performance. To avoid any confusion, we used the MRS terminology.  
Question 3: Do GPs differ in their preferences for screening incentives?  
The binary logit model implicitly assumes that all GPs’ hold same preferences for the proposed 
attributes of cancer screening programmes. This assumption can be misleading since there is 
evidence in the literature of considerable variability in GPs’ involvement in cancer screening 
activities whatever the type of cancer (Bungener et al., 2010). In this section we relax the 
assumption of preferences homogeneity by fitting a Hierarchical Bayes mixed logit model 
(labelled HB-MXL) estimated through the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. 
There are several benefits of using the Bayesian version of the mixed logit model over the more 
traditional (i.e. frequentist) version (see (Regier et al., 2009) for a comparison of both 
methodologies). First the Bayesian approach allows making a distinction between preferences 
“heterogeneity” (i.e. between-GP variability in estimated preferences) and preferences 
“uncertainty” (i.e. within-GP variability in estimated preferences) (Daziano and Achtnicht, 2014). 
Second the HB-MXL approach allows estimation of the whole distribution of preferences rather 
than only the mean and standard deviation, what will facilitate the comparison of GPs’ 
preferences across screening contexts. Eventually, it has been argued that Bayesian inference 
performs better than traditional frequentist approach when working on moderate to low sample 
sizes (Train, 2003).  
The HB-MXL model was specified in MRS-space in order to facilitate computation of MRS 
coefficients and comparison of preferences across cancer screening contexts (Train and Weeks, 
2005). The MRS-space HB-MXL model applied to our context is written as following: 
5 5 1 2 3 4( ) +    (3)
     
nti n n t n n n t n t n t ntiU PAY w LEAF w TRAIN w LIST w ASSIST        
 
Where (            ) is the ratio of the non-financial attribute k’s coefficient to the PAY 
coefficient being interpreted directly as a marginal rate of substitution. The six random 
parameters (                  are assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution with 
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full covariance matrix to be estimated. Because of the panel nature of data (i.e., multiple choices 
per GP), the HB-MXL model can also be used to recover preferences for each GP, allowing thus 
for comparison of MRS distribution across the three cancer screening contexts (see Train, 2003, 
chapter 12, for a detailed description of Bayesian procedures applied to discrete choice data). 
Details about estimation of equation 3 using the MCMC algorithm are provided in Appendix 1. 
The HB-MXL models were estimated using the RSGHB package written in R software (Dumont 
et al., 2015). 
 
4. Results 
4.1/ Samples of respondents 
The initial samples included 135 GPs for the breast cancer screening questionnaire, 133 GPs for 
the cervical cancer screening questionnaire, and 134 GPs for the colorectal cancer screening 
questionnaire, for a total of 402 respondents. After exclusion of serial non-traders (i.e. GPs 
systematically answering ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in all choice tasks), the estimation samples included 108 GPs 
(80%) for the breast cancer questionnaire, 111 GPs (83%) for the cervical cancer questionnaire, 
and 114 GPs (85%) for the colorectal cancer questionnaire. Non-traders were excluded from the 
analyses because they provide no useful information for the estimation of GPs’ preferences. We 
verified that exclusion of non-traders did not introduce a selection bias by comparing their 
characteristics to those of the included respondents. The included and excluded respondents 
were not significantly different (at the 5% level) in terms of age, gender, practice location, group 
practice, activity and screening practices (see Appendix 3 for test results). 
Descriptive statistics of the three surveys’ populations are displayed in Table 2. In the 
three samples, the included GPs are representative of the French GP population in terms of 
gender (72% are males), age (the mean age is 52 years vs. 50.1 years in the total French GP 
population), and practice location. The distribution of GPs in rural or urban areas, type of 
practice (group vs solo) and screening practices is similar from one cancer to another: about 66% 
of GPs work in urban areas, about 49% of GPs work in a group  and about 71% of GPs declare 
checking whether the patient has performed a screening for the studied cancer on a very regular 
basis (i.e. ‘systematically’ or ‘very often’). 
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4.2/ Discrete choices modelling 
Question 1: What are GPs’ preferences for both financial and non-financial incentives? 
The results of the binary logit models are displayed in Table 3 (the results do not differ when 
including non-traders in the models, see Supplementary file B for robustness checks). 
Information about the number (%) of I don’t know responses, which were discarded from the 
subsequent analyses, are presented in Supplementary file C. The results of the main effects model 
for breast cancer show that all the attributes but Assistance (ASSIST) are significant and with the 
expected sign. The most weighted attributes are the Listing (LIST=0.84 [0.55; 1.13]) and the 
Training (TRAIN=0.73 [0.48; 0.99]). The two interaction effects LEAF x PAY and ASSIST x 
LIST are positive but not significant at the 5% level. Results of S-estimates show that inclusion of 
at least 319 GPs in the survey would have been necessary in order to obtain a statistically 
significant impact of ASSIST at the 5% level. Nonsignificance of ASSIST could thus be partially 
explained by the relatively low sample size.  
Regarding cervical cancer screening, all attributes are significant at the 5% level and, 
similar to breast cancer screening, the most weighted attributes are the Listing (LIST=0.94 [0.63; 
1.25]) and the Training (TRAIN=0.80 [0.53; 1.08]). The interaction effects are also not significant 
at the 5% level.  
In the colorectal cancer screening context, all the attributes but Assistance are significant 
at the 5% level, and GPs are mainly sensitive to the Listing (LIST=0.57 [0.29; 0.85]), Training 
(TRAIN=0.54 [0.27; 0.80]), and Payment (PAY=0.45 [0.37; 0.53]). There is a significant 
interaction effect between Listing and Assistance (LIST x ASSIST= 0.46 [0.04; 0.88]) meaning 
that combined, these two attributes are more weighted in GPs’ utility function than when 
proposed separately. However, the results of the likelihood ratio (LR) tests comparing statistical 
performance of the choice models with and without the interaction effects indicate that 
interaction effects do not significantly improve the data fit (LR test: Chi-2=1.67; DF=2; P-
value=0.4338). We also used LR tests to investigate the relevance of using nonlinear coding for 
the PAY attribute, by comparing two rival models using 1) a categorical coding scheme and 2) a 
polynomial function. Modelling nonlinearities did not significantly improve model fit for cervical 
and colorectal cancers, though it increased the model likelihood for breast cancer (results of the 
LR tests are available upon request). For parsimonious reason and to better compare the results 
across cancer screening settings, we decided to keep the linear coding scheme. 
Question 2: Are GPs’ preferences cancer-specific? 
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The results of the mean marginal rates of substitution (MRS) derived from the binary logit 
models are presented in Table 3. The GPs are systematically more sensitive to non-financial 
attributes in the context of breast and cervical cancers as compared to colorectal cancer 
screening, although the differences in mean MRS are not statistically significant at the 5% level. 
For instance, in the context of breast and cervical cancer screening, the GPs are willing to give up 
potential increases of 2.07% (95% CI: [1.23; 2.90%]) and 2.47% (95% CI: [1.48; 3.47%]) of their 
turnover, respectively, to beneficiate from the Training, compared to 1.20% (95% CI: [0.60-
1.80%]) in the context of colorectal cancer screening. The MRS are the highest for the listing: the 
GPs are willing to give up potential increases of 2.36% (breast cancer), 2.89% (cervical cancer) 
and 1.27% (colorectal cancer) to benefit from the listing. Assistance is the least desirable 
attribute, and the MRS for this attribute is not significant for breast cancer screening (MRS = 
0.45% [-0.40; 1.30%]) and colorectal cancer screening (MRS=0.04% [-0.53; 0.62]).  
The comparison of preferences between cancer screening contexts is detailed by relaxing 
the assumption of preference homogeneity and analysing the results of the HB-MXL models. For 
each cancer, the cumulative density functions (CDFs) of MRS estimates are displayed in Figure 2, 
and the quartiles of the posterior distribution are presented in Table 4. 
A visual analysis of the CDFs shows that the distributions of MRS differ across cancer 
screening contexts and type of screening incentive. The CDFs are most shifted for the Leaflet, 
with the MRS being the highest for cervical cancer at all points of the distribution. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests confirm that for this attribute, the distribution of MRS 
estimates are not equal across cancer screening contexts (p<0.0001). For instance, for cervical 
cancer, half of GPs have an estimated MRS for the leaflet > 1.61% as compared to 1.25% for 
breast cancer and 0.99% for colorectal cancer. 
Regarding the other non-financial attributes, we find that the CDF for Training, Listing 
and Assistance are systematically more shifted toward higher MRS values in the context of breast 
and cervical cancer screening as compared to colorectal cancer screening. This result supports the 
conclusion that GPs are more sensitive to non-financial incentives for breast and cervical cancers. 
For instance, for cervical cancer, half of GPs have an estimated MRS for Training > 2.10% 
(respectively, 1.95% for breast cancer), compared to 1.15% for colorectal cancer. Statistically 
speaking, the KS tests comparing the CDFs of MRS estimates between gynaecological cancers 
(either breast or cervical) and colorectal cancer systematically reject the null hypothesis of equal 
distributions (p<0.0001). However, the CDFs are not significantly different (at the 1% level) 
between breast and cervical cancer for the Training (p=0.0743) and for the Listing (p=0.0454), 
showing that GPs’ preferences are more similar in breast and cervical cancers screening contexts. 
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Question 3: Do GPs differ in their preferences for screening incentives? 
In order to assess the level of preference heterogeneity (between-GP variability), we plotted the 
individual MRS estimates for each GP and in each cancer screening context. In addition, as an 
indicator of the level of preference heterogeneity, we calculated the interquartile range (IQR) as 
the difference between the upper and lower quartile of the MRS distribution (see Table 4). In 
Figure 3, there is evidence of greater preference heterogeneity for Training, Listing and 
Assistance in the context of breast and cervical cancers screening as compared to colorectal 
cancer screening. For instance, the IQR for the listing is 2.28 (Q1=1.11, Q3=3.39) for cervical 
cancer as compared to only 0.76 (Q1=0.73, Q3=1.49) for colorectal cancer. 
In order to assess the level of preference uncertainty (within-GP variability), we calculated 
the quartiles of the MRS’s standard deviation distribution (results are reported in Table 4). 
Complementarily, preference uncertainty was assessed graphically by plotting the estimated MRS 
plus / minus their standard deviation, for each GP and in each cancer screening context (see 
Figure 3). There is evidence of greater preference uncertainty in the context of breast and cervical 
cancers screening: at all point of the distribution, the standard deviations are higher for breast 
and cervical cancers as compared to colorectal cancer. For instance, the mean standard deviation 
of MRS estimates for the Training is 1.30 for cervical cancer, 1.21 for breast cancer and 0.85 for 
colorectal cancer. Looking at Figure 3, the range of MRS draws represented by the dotted lines is 




To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate GPs’ preferences for both 
financial and non-financial incentives for taking part to cancer screening activities. This study 
contributes to the literature by addressing three research questions. First, we examined how GPs 
make trade-offs between financial and non-financial incentives. Second, we analysed variations in 
GPs’ preferences according to the cancer screening context by focusing on breast, cervical, and 




In this study, we showed that GPs’ trade-offs for screening incentives depend on the type 
of cancer: no single attribute dominates all others for all cancers (including the financial 
attribute). This result is interesting because it seems not to have been demonstrated before, while 
it could partly explain the contrasting conclusions obtained in the literature. Our results indicate 
that in the context of breast and cervical cancers, GPs are particularly sensitive to receiving 
compensated training and to receive a bi-annual listing of screened patients to identify eligible 
women not to date with their screening. The conclusion holds when we take into account 
preference heterogeneity. This result is consistent with previous studies that highlighted the need 
for training (McIlfatrick et al., 2013) and for transmission of information particularly in the 
context of gynaecological cancers (Liberalotto, 2012).  
Regarding cervical cancer screening, GPs are in competition with other doctors such as 
gynaecologists, who perform most of pap smears in France (Bungener et al., 2010). They may be 
looking for training and feedback on their practices to feel more confident about this act, thus 
explaining their high marginal rates of substitution for these services. It is interesting to note that 
these non-financial incentives would be workable in practice and would not necessarily be as 
expensive as financial incentives.  
Regarding colorectal cancer screening, the additional payment had relatively more impact, 
even if the differences between cancers are not statistically significant on average. The result 
could be explained by the fact that the GP is expected to play an important role in explaining the 
modalities of the test and/or convincing all eligible patients to perform the test, and time has an 
opportunity cost requiring compensation. Indeed, according to a recent survey from the French 
National Institute of Cancer (INCa), 27% of GPs declare that the explanation of FOBT is time 
consuming (Bungener et al., 2010). Another argument may explain the result: colorectal cancer 
screening is destined to a relatively large population in the GP patient base (men and women 
aged 50 to 74 years). Thus, providing prevention to all by explaining and justifying screening will 
be time consuming and the achievement of target rates will probably come at a cost. Contrary to 
breast and cervical cancers, colorectal cancer screening has not been included in a P4P scheme 
yet: our results indicate that GPs are probably expecting financial rewards particularly for this 
cancer. 
The joint influence of both financial and non-financial incentives was investigated by 
including two interactions as arguments of GPs’ utility function. The first interaction was 
between the Payment (financial) and the Leaflet (non-financial) incentive and was never 
significant in none of the screening contexts. This result may be explained by the fact that the 
Leaflet was not an attractive incentive per se and the association with financial rewards did not 
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change its intrinsic value. That the Leaflet was less desirable than the other attributes is consistent 
with it not being an innovative device, because doctors as well as patients could already download 
documents produced and available online by reliable institutions such as the National Cancer 
Institute or the League against Cancer. This non significant result might also be explained 
considering that two opposing effects were at work: a positive interaction effect for GPs 
considering that the additional payment offsets the opportunity cost of providing leaflets, and a 
null or negative effect for GPs considering that leaflet is a long-term investment used to decrease 
time spent in future prevention consultations. 
Then we investigated a potential interaction effect between two non-financial incentives, 
namely the Listing and the Assistance. The interaction effect was always positive in all screening 
contexts, but it was significant only in the colorectal cancer screening context. One possible 
rationale for this result is that, as stated previously, providing prevention to all by explaining and 
justifying screening may be more time consuming for colorectal cancer, thus the listing was more 
valued when accompanied with trained staff providing help to identify and raise the awareness of 
individuals not up to date with their screening. This non significant result could also be explained 
by the low valuation of the Assistance in all cancer screening contexts.  
The analysis of preference heterogeneity was achieved by fitting Hierarchical Bayes mixed 
logit models. To our knowledge, it is the first application of this methodology in a health context 
that resulted in estimating subject-specific preferences and comparing the distribution of 
preferences in different cancer screening contexts. Interestingly, we have shown that the level of 
between- and within-GP variability depends on the type of cancer: there is greater preference 
heterogeneity and also greater preference uncertainty for screening incentives in the context of 
breast and cervical cancers as compared to colorectal cancer. This result may be explained by the 
fact the environment underlying breast and cervical cancer screening is more complex, especially 
because GPs are in competition with other health care professionals such as gynaecologists who 
prescribe most of mammograms and pap smears in France. As a consequence, the perception of 
the usefulness of a particular incentive as well as the degree of accuracy in elaborating preferences 
for cancer screening programmes may depend on exogeneous factors (e.g. the density of 
gynaecologists in the region indicating greater competition) and/or GPs’ characteristics such as 
gender, experience, training, or specialised activity. Indeed, sociological studies have shown that 
female GPs show greater commitment towards breast and cervical cancers screening compared 
to male GPs (Liberalotto, 2012). However, due to sample size issues, we were not able to relate 
variations of preferences to GPs’ individual characteristics. Eventually, current debates about the 
benefits and harms of breast cancer screening could translate into different attitudes and 
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preferences towards mammography, thus explaining greater preference heterogeneity and 
uncertainty. 
Study limitations 
The design of the survey using the quota method ensured that our samples of respondents were 
representative of the French GP population in terms of age, gender, and geographical location. 
However, respondents represented a sample of individuals who voluntarily accessed the 
questionnaire. This opt-in nature of the sample reduces the generalizability of the results and 
constitutes an important issue to be considered for the sampling of respondents in discrete 
choices surveys. Yet, we believe that the selection of respondents was limited as we achieved a 
high incidence rate (60%), meaning that 6 GP out of ten completed the entire questionnaire after 
clicking on the survey link. Moreover, the fact that the e-mail contained little information about 
the survey and that GPs were financially rewarded to answer the questionnaire certainly enabled 
to mitigate selection issues of GPs who, for instance, could be more involved in cancer screening 
activities or more interested by the subject. Removal of about 15-20% of serial non-traders is 
another limitation of our study. Yet the included and excluded GPs were not significantly 
different from one another and sensitivity analyses showed that removal of non-traders did not 
change the results (see Supplementary file B). 
Regarding the estimation of single profiles DCE models, we assumed that the utility 
associated with the reference situation (the GP usual practice context) was null. This is a strong 
assumption as the ‘current situation’ is likely to largely differ among GPs. Yet, such differences 
were captured by the constant parameter of the utility function that was allowed to vary over the 
sample in the HB-MXL models. Thus, any differences in GPs’ reference situation were reflected 
in variability of estimates of the constant parameter. Eventually one limitation of our approach is 
that we explicitly assumed that GPs’ systematic preferences for current situation were normally 
distributed over the sample, whereas it might be the case that sample preferences would be best 
described by other continuous/finite distributions. This design was preferred to a more 
traditional pairwise comparison between two (or more) alternatives, first because we anticipated 
that GPs would have more difficulties comparing and inferring utilities from two or more 
hypothetical scenarios compared to one, second because of the fact they already experienced a 
situation where some attributes were available (e.g. leaflets, P4P) so that they could find it 





The study provides meaningful results for policymakers wishing to increase GPs’ involvement in 
breast, cervical, and colorectal cancer screening. Screening programmes that would favour GPs 
implication are both financial and non-financial; they include training and systematic 
communication of information between doctors and patients. Non-financial incentives could be 
stronger motivators for breast and cervical cancers, and financial incentives are likely to have 
more impact for colorectal cancer. Additional research is needed to assess the performance of 
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Table 1. Summary of attributes, coding scheme, and expected effects 
Attributes Definition Levels Coding
Expected 
effect
Leaflet (LEAF) Providing GPs with cancer screening leaflets yes, no dummy β1 >0
Training (TRAIN) Compensated targeted training for the GP yes, no dummy β2 >0
Listing (LIST) Bi-annual listing of screened patients yes, no dummy β3 >0
Assistance (ASSIST) Qualified staff assistance yes, no dummy β4 >0
Payment (PAY)
Additional payment based on patients' 
screening rates improvement






Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the three samples of respondents (after exclusion of serial non-
traders) 
N % N % N % N %
Gender
Female 30 27.8 30 27.0 32 28.1 92 27.6
Male 78 72.2 81 73.0 82 71.9 241 72.4
Age
<45 years 18 16.7 24 21.6 25 21.9 67 20.1
45-54 years 44 40.7 34 30.6 46 40.4 124 37.2
>54 years 46 42.6 53 47.8 43 37.7 142 42.6
Practice location
Paris neighborhood 18 16.7 20 18.0 22 19.3 60 18.0
North 4 3.7 8 7.2 10 8.8 22 6.6
East 22 20.4 32 28.8 24 21.1 78 23.4
West 24 22.2 21 18.9 20 17.5 65 19.5
South 40 37.0 30 27.0 38 33.3 108 32.4
Type of location
Rural (<=10,000 inhabitants) 34 31.5 36 32.4 44 38.6 114 34.2
Urban (>10,000 inhabitants) 74 68.5 75 67.6 70 61.4 219 65.8
Type of practice
Solo 58 53.7 56 50.5 56 49.1 170 51.1
Group 50 46.3 55 49.6 58 50.9 163 48.9
Number of hours worked /week
<= 50 hours 48 44.4 61 54.9 59 51.7 168 50.5
>50 hours 60 55.6 50 45.1 55 48.3 165 49.5
Screening practices
Systematic 42 38.9 42 37.8 37 32.5 121 36.3
Very often 34 31.5 40 36.0 44 38.6 118 35.4
Often 28 25.9 22 19.8 25 21.9 75 22.5
Sometines/never 4 3.7 7 6.3 8 7.0 19 5.7
Total 108 100 111 100 114 100 333 100





Table 3. Estimation results for the binary logit models  
Main effects (1) Interactions (2) Main effects (1) Interactions (2) Main effects (1) Interactions (2)
Coef. [95% CI] Coef. [95% CI] Coef. [95% CI] Coef. [95% CI] Coef. [95% CI] Coef. [95% CI]
1. Preferences estimates
Intercept -1.77 [-2.22; -1.32] -1.61 [-2.09; -1.13] -1.82 [-2.22; -1.41] -1.75 [-2.18; -1.32] -1.70 [-2.12; -1.29] -1.49 [-1.93; -1.06]
LEAF 0.42 [0.21; 0.63] 0.27 [-0.03; 0.56] 0.51 [0.28; 0.74] 0.56 [0.26; 0.85] 0.30 [0.06; 0.54] 0.15 [-0.16; 0.46]
TRAIN 0.73 [0.48; 0.99] 0.67 [0.42; 0.93] 0.80 [0.53; 1.08] 0.79 [0.51; 1.06] 0.54 [0.27; 0.80] 0.46 [0.20; 0.73]
LIST 0.84 [0.55; 1.13] 0.71 [0.33; 1.08] 0.94 [0.63; 1.25] 0.84 [0.46; 1.21] 0.57 [0.29; 0.85] 0.36 [0.03; 0.70]
ASSIST 0.16 [-0.14; 0.46] 0.03 [-0.37; 0.43] 0.46 [0.17; 0.75] 0.35 [-0.05; 0.75] 0.02 [-0.24; 0.28] -0.21 [-0.55; 0.15]
PAY 0.35 [0.27; 0.44] 0.33 [0.25; 0.42] 0.33 [0.24; 0.41] 0.33 [0.25; 0.42] 0.45 [0.37; 0.53] 0.43 [0.35; 0.51]
LEAF×PAY - 0.05 [-0.07; 0.17] - -0.04 [-0.16; 0.08] - 0.04 [-0.08; 0.15]
LIST×ASSIST - 0.31 [-0.09; 0.71] - 0.18 [-0.23; 0.59] - 0.46 [0.04; 0.88]
2. MRS estimates (in %)
LEAF 1.18 [0.61; 1.23] - 1.57 [0.85; 2.28] - 0.67 [0.14; 1.19] -
TRAIN 2.07 [1.23; 2.90] - 2.47 [1.48; 3.47] - 1.20 [0.60; 1.80] -
LIST 2.36 [1.44; 3.28] - 2.89 [1.67; 4.10] - 1.27 [0.60; 1.92] -
ASSIST 0.45 [-0.40; 1.30] - 1.41 [0.45; 2.37] - 0.04 [-0.53; 0.62] -
3. Model statistics
Number of GPs 108 108 111 111 114 114
Number of observations 1180 1180 1222 1222 1251 1251
Log-Likelihood -717.45 -716.45 -734.31 -734.07 -748.39 -746.72
Pseudo R2 0.122 0.123 0.126 0.126 0.137 0.139
S-estimatesᵃ 319 5683 46 11,577 17,477 29,806
Breast cancer Cervical cancer Colorectal cancer
 
ᵃ The S-estimate is the minimum sample size for estimating significant parameters. It is the maximum of all Sp-estimates, where Sp-estimates indicate the number of 
respondents needed to obtain a significant estimate of each parameter of the utility function (Hensher et al., 2015). For instance, in order to obtain a significant effect of 
ASSIST (the attribute with lowest t-ratio), it would have required 319 respondents for breast cancer, and 17,477 respondents for colorectal cancer. Similarly, in order to 
estimate a significant interaction between LEAF and PAY, it would have required 5683 respondents for breast cancer, 11,577 respondents for cervical cancer, and 29,806 




Table 4. Quartiles of the posterior distribution of individual MRS estimates – HB-MXL results 
Attribute Quartiles Est ᵃ SD ᵇ Est SD Est SD
LEAF Q1 1.06 0.67 1.36 0.79 0.79 0.71
Mean 1.27 0.75 1.61 0.85 1.01 0.79
Q2 (Median) 1.25 0.75 1.61 0.84 0.99 0.76
Q3 1.42 0.79 1.91 0.90 1.28 0.82
IQR ᶜ (Q3-Q1) 0.36 0.55 0.49
TRAIN Q1 1.49 1.04 1.63 1.17 0.81 0.77
Mean 1.89 1.21 2.18 1.30 1.14 0.85
Q2 (Median) 1.95 1.16 2.10 1.29 1.15 0.82
Q3 2.30 1.30 2.87 1.36 1.46 0.90
IQR  (Q3-Q1) ᶜ 0.81 1.24 0.65
LIST Q1 1.25 1.37 1.11 1.75 0.73 0.98
Mean 2.01 1.57 2.28 1.98 1.17 1.13
Q2 (Median) 1.88 1.53 1.83 1.92 1.14 1.07
Q3 2.62 1.65 3.39 2.10 1.49 1.20
IQR  (Q3-Q1) ᶜ 1.37 2.28 0.76
ASSIST Q1 -0.29 1.43 0.85 1.23 0.00 0.77
Mean 0.9 1.70 1.36 1.34 0.26 0.85
Q2 (Median) 0.98 1.60 1.47 1.33 0.28 0.82
Q3 1.62 1.78 1.90 1.40 0.55 0.89
IQR  (Q3-Q1) ᶜ 1.91 1.05 0.55
PAY Q1 0.65 0.44 0.58 0.32 0.63 0.39
Mean 0.86 0.48 0.73 0.36 0.83 0.42
Q2 (Median) 1.02 0.49 0.79 0.37 0.95 0.43
Q3 1.19 0.52 0.97 0.40 1.11 0.46
IQR  (Q3-Q1) ᶜ 0.54 0.39 0.48
Breast cancer Cervical cancer Colorectal cancer
MRS (%) MRS (%) MRS (%)
ᵃ 
ᵃ Mean MRS values calculated for each GP over the 5,000 MCMC draws retained after convergence. 
ᵇ Standard deviation from mean MRS values calculated for each GP over the 5,000 MCMC draws retained after 
convergence. 
ᶜ Interquartile range : statistical measure of the dispersion of GPs’ MRS values.  
Lecture: For breast cancer, half of GPs have a mean MRS value for the Leaflet higher than 1.25 (median), and 25% 
of GPs have a mean MRS value higher than 1.42 (Q3). The difference between the upper quartile and the lower 





Figure 1. Example of a choice task 
Cancer screening programme A
You are provided with [*] cancer screening leaflets for your patients
You are being financed a training for [*] cancer screening 
You don't have access to a bi-annual listing of screened patients
You don't benefit from a qualified staff assistance
You benefit from a 3% additional payment based on targeted screening objective




□ I don't know













Appendix 1. Details on the MCMC procedure to estimate the HB-MXL models (equation 3) 
The MCMC algorithm was used to estimate the joint posterior distribution of the coefficients 
given the data (Allenby and Rossi, 1998). The Markov chain was initialized using non-informative 
priors: a centred normal distribution with large variance for the random parameters’ mean, and an 
inverted Wishart distribution for the random parameters’ standard deviation (Train, 2003). The 
random parameters were assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution with vector of 
mean parameters and matrix of variance-covariance parameters to be estimated. We used a full 
covariance matrix (6x6=36 elements) to model variability in GPs preferences for the screening 
attributes and how these preferences relate with each other. This is another advantage of the 
bayesian approach, which allows easily exploring parameters space with many dimensions. 
The main issue when using MCMC is to determine when the Markov chain has 
converged. In order to check that convergence was attained, we inspected the traceplot to see if 
the draws traversed the posterior (Train, 2003) as well as the autocorrelation over the draws. We 
also performed the Heidelberger-Welch test that assesses the convergence of the Markov chain 
by testing the hypothesis that the chain comes from a stationary process (Heidelberger and 
Welch, 1983). These diagnostics were used to define the length of the ‘burn-in period’ (i.e. the 
number of iterations occurring prior to convergence that were discarded), the number of 
iterations that were used to conduct inference, and the proportion of iterations that were retained 
after convergence to reduce correlation across the Markov chain (Kass et al., 1998).  
In the cervical and colorectal cancer subsamples, 50,000 iterations were used as ‘burn-in’ 
after which every 10-th draw was retained from 50,000 additional iterations, providing a total of 
5,000 draws from the posterior distribution of the parameters. In the breast cancer subsample, 
50,000 iterations were used as ‘burn-in’, but autocorrelation was more important and 
convergence could only be achieved by retaining every 20-th draw from 100,000 additional 
iterations, providing a total of 5,000 draws to conduct inference (see Appendix 2 for a summary 




Appendix 2. Summary of the MCMC convergence diagnostics 
Burn-in Iter. after Iter. kept after
Result p-value period convergence convergence
Breast cancer screening
Intercept passed 0.806 50,000 100,000 5,000
LEAF passed 0.318 50,000 100,000 5,000
TRAIN passed 0.602 50,000 100,000 5,000
LIST passed 0.312 50,000 100,000 5,000
ASSIST passed 0.409 50,000 100,000 5,000
PAY passed 0.529 50,000 100,000 5,000
Cervical cancer screening
Intercept passed 0.281 50,000 50,000 5,000
LEAF passed 0.124 50,000 50,000 5,000
TRAIN passed 0.293 50,000 50,000 5,000
LIST passed 0.181 50,000 50,000 5,000
ASSIST passed 0.128 50,000 50,000 5,000
PAY passed 0.341 50,000 50,000 5,000
Colorectal cancer screening
Intercept passed 0.471 50,000 50,000 5,000
LEAF passed 0.637 50,000 50,000 5,000
TRAIN passed 0.606 50,000 50,000 5,000
LIST passed 0.606 50,000 50,000 5,000
ASSIST passed 0.052 50,000 50,000 5,000







Appendix 3. Comparison of the characteristics of traders and serial non-traders 
Chi-square test
N col % N col % N % P-value
Gender 0.542
Female 20 31.3* 93 27.5 113 28.1
Male 44 68.8 245 72.5 289 71.9
Age 0.521
<45 years 13 20.3 68 20.1 81 20.2
45-54 years 32 50.0 146 43.2 178 44.3
>54 years
Practice location 0.085
Paris neighborhood 12 18.8 60 17.8 72 17.9
North 5 7.8 22 6.5 27 6.7
East 21 32.8 79 23.4 100 24.9
West 16 25.0 66 19.5 82 20.4
South
Type of location 0.592
Rural (<=10,000 inhabitants) 24 37.5 115 34.0 139 34.6
Urban (>10,000 inhabitants) 40 62.5 223 65.9 263 65.4
Type of practice 0.213
Solo 38 59.4 172 50.9 210 52.2
Group 26 40.6 166 49.1 192 47.8
Number of hours worked /week 0.965
<= 50 hours 32 50.0 170 50.3 202 50.3
>50 hours 32 50.0 168 49.7 200 49.8
Screening practices 0.602
Systematic 28 43.8 121 35.8 149 37.1
Very often 21 32.8 121 35.8 142 35.3
Often 11 17.2 77 22.8 88 21.9
Sometines/never 4 6.3 19 5.6 23 5.7
Trading behaviour
Always 'yes' 37 57.8 - - - -
Alwayes 'no' 27 42.2 - - - -
Total 64 15.9 338 84.1 402 100.0
Non-traders Traders Overall
 
Lecture (*): among non-traders, 31.3% were females, compared to 28.1% in the overall population. Among non-
traders, 57.8% systematically responded 'yes' to the choice questions, and 42.2% systematically responded ‘no’. 
The significance of bold represents the Chi-square independence test for the association between the individual 










Provision of cancer screening leaflets for your patients, containing information about 
breast cancer and mammography  
Training 
Compensated training including the following items:                                                        
- Analysis of difficulties in screening uptake, strategies of conviction/application, 
coordination with other specialists                                                                                              
- Benefits and harms balance of mammography, degree of treatment and quality of life 
according to prognosis
Listing 
Bi-annual listing of patients aged 50-74 years having performed a mamogram in the past 
two years
Assistance 
Qualified staff assistance to monitor the screening of your patients, including either:                       
- Presence of taff for the reception/advice of patients, twice a month                                         
- Networking with a call centre to contact or revive patients not to date with their 
screening
Payment 
Additional payment conditional or reaching (or drawing closer to) 80% of female patients 





Provision of cancer screening leaflets for your patients, containing information about 
cervical cancer and Pap smears  
Training 
Compensated training including the following items:                                                        
- Analysis of difficulties in screening uptake, strategies of conviction/application, 
coordination with other specialists                                                                                              
- Realisation of Pap smears, degree of treatment and quality of life according to prognosis
Listing 
Bi-annual listing of patients aged 25-65 years having performed a Pap smears in the past 
three years
Assistance 
Qualified staff assistance to monitor the screening of your patients, including either:                       
- Presence of taff for the reception/advice of patients, twice a month                                         
- Networking with a call centre to contact or revive patients not to date with their 
screening
Payment 
Additional payment conditional or reaching (or drawing closer to) 80% of female patients 







Provision of cancer screening leaflets for your patients, containing information about 
colorectal cancer and Hemoccult tests  
Training 
Compensated training including the following items:                                                        
- Analysis of difficulties in screening uptake, strategies of conviction/application, 
coordination with other specialists                                                                                              
- Benefits of early detection, degree of treatment and quality of life according to 
prognosis
Listing 
Bi-annual listing of patients aged 50-74 years having performed an hemoccult test in the 
past two years
Assistance 
Qualified staff assistance to monitor the screening of your patients, including either:                       
- Presence of taff for the reception/advice of patients, twice a month                                         
- Networking with a call centre to contact or revive patients not to date with their 
screening
Payment 
Additional payment conditional or reaching (or drawing closer to) 50% of patients (males 





Supplementary file B. Results of the binary logit model among the general population (including non-traders) 
Main effects (1) Interactions (2) Main effects (1) Interactions (2) Main effects (1) Interactions (2)
Coef. [95% CI] Coef. [95% CI] Coef. [95% CI] Coef. [95% CI] Coef. [95% CI] Coef. [95% CI]
1. Preferences estimates
Intercept -1.53 [-1.90; -1.17] -1.41 [-1.81; -1.03] -1.50 [-1.87; -1.15] -1.47 [-1.85; -1.10] -1.50 [-1.88; -1.13] -1.32 [-1.71; -0.94]
LEAF 0.33 [0.16; 0.49] 0.32 [-0.07; 0.57] 0.39 [0.20; 0.58] 0.50 [0.25; 0.75] 0.25 [0.06; 0.45] 0.16 [-0.10; 0.42]
TRAIN 0.59 [0.38; 0.79] 0.55 [0.35; 0.75] 0.63 [0.40; 0.87] 0.63 [0.40; 0.86] 0.44 [0.22; 0.66] 0.39 [0.16; 0.60]
LIST 0.70 [0.47; 0.94] 0.55 [0.26; 0.84] 0.76 [0.50; 1.02] 0.65 [0.34; 0.96] 0.47 [0.24; 0.70] 0.28 [0.00; 0.56]
ASSIST 0.08 [-0.15; 0.31] -0.09 [-0.39; 0.22] 0.36 [0.12; 0.60] 0.24 [-0.08; 0.57] 0.00 [-0.21; 0.22] -0.19 [-0.49; 0.10]
PAY 0.29 [0.22; 0.35] 0.29 [0.22; 0.36] 0.26 [0.20; 0.33] 0.28 [0.21; 0.35] 0.38 [0.31; 0.45] 0.37 [0.30; 0.44]
LEAF×PAY - -0.02 [-0.11; 0.07] - -0.07 [-0.15; 0.02] - 0.01 [-0.07; 0.76]
LIST×ASSIST - 0.30 [-0.02; 0.63] - 0.17 [-0.16; 0.51] - 0.40 [0.03; 0.76]
2. MRS estimates (in %)
LEAF 1.15 [0.61; 1.70] - 1.48 [0.77; 2.19] - 0.67 [0.16; 1.18] -
TRAIN 2.05 [1.23; 2.86] - 2.41 [1.4; 3.42] - 1.17 [0.58; 1.76] -
LIST 2.45 [1.53; 3.36] - 2.89 [1.65; 4.12] - 1.24 [0.58; 1.90] -
ASSIST 0.27 [-0.55; 1.01] - 1.37 [0.40; 2.34] - 0.01 [-0.56; 0.58] -
3. Model statistics
Number of GPs 132 132 128 128 131 131
Number of observations 1440 1440 1423 1423 1448 1448
Log-Likelihood -911.42 -910.74 -895.49 -894.97 -899.25 -897.9
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.087 0.089 0.090 0.103 0.105





Supplementary file C. Number (%) of ‘I don’t know’ responses across cancer screening 
contexts 
N % N % N %
Scenario 1 10 7.4 13 9.8 9 6.7
Scenario 2 17 12.6 14 10.5 7 5.2
Scenario 3 21 15.6 19 14.3 16 11.9
Scenario 4 15 11.1 15 11.3 10 7.5
Scenario 5 13 9.6 15 11.3 22 16.4
Scenario 6 13 9.6 11 8.3 15 11.2
Scenario 7 13 9.6 19 14.3 15 11.2
Scenario 8 21 15.6 12 9.0 11 8.2
Scenario 9 14 10.4 14 10.5 16 11.9
Scenario 10 12 8.9 14 10.5 17 12.7
Scenario 11 12 8.9 11 8.3 5 3.7
Scenario 12 5 3.7 2 1.5 7 5.2
Mean 14 10.2 13 10.0 13 9.3
Breast cancer Cervical cancer Colorectal cancer
 
 
